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The Difference of One Vote or One Day: 
Reviewing the Demographics of Florida’s 
Death Row After Hurst v. Florida 
MELANIE KALMANSON* 
As the federal appeals court with jurisdiction over Flor-
ida and Alabama—two leaders in capital punishment in the 
United States—the Eleventh Circuit reviews several claims 
each year related to capital punishment. Florida is home to 
one of the largest death row populations in the country. 
Thus, understanding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
important for understanding capital punishment nationwide. 
This Article analyzes the empirical demographics of 
Florida’s death row population and reviews how defendants 
are sentenced to death and ultimately executed in Florida. 
The analysis reveals that although age is not a factor upon 
which murder/manslaughter defendants are discriminated 
against in the sentencing process, gender and race are. With 
respect to the death penalty, gender discrimination appears 
consistent, but racial discrimination appears inconsistent 
and, instead, more apparent in the processes that occur be-
fore defendants are actually sent to death row. Additionally, 
the analysis suggests the absence of discrimination in capi-
tal sentencing and executions because the racial, age, and 
 
 *  J.D., Florida State University College of Law (2016); Staff Attorney to 
former Florida Supreme Court Justice Barbara J. Pariente from August 2016 until 
January 2019; currently focusing on appellate law in private practice. Since my 
clerkship, I have written and published several pieces on the effects of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida and the death penalty generally. 
Funny story: When I originally gave my first draft of this to Justice Pariente, she 
jokingly gave me a B+. I hope this is better now, Judge.  
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ethnic makeup of Florida’s death row and, more specifically, 
those who are executed in Florida, are almost completely 
unpredictable. 
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in 
Hurst v. Florida, together with the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida’s decisions on remand in Hurst v. State and other related 
decisions, upended capital sentencing in Florida and be-
yond. This Article examines how the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida’s post-Hurst framework—which the Eleventh Circuit has 
also been called upon to review and implement in reviewing 
several federal habeas claims since Hurst––affected Flor-
ida’s death row empirically. In doing so, this Article fore-
shadows how the Court’s 2020 decision in State v. Poole, 
which recedes from the Court’s decision on remand in Hurst, 
and other potential decisions in the future may affect Flor-
ida’s death row. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the death penalty was reinstituted in 1976,1 Florida has 
been a leader in capital punishment, making it one of the most death-
friendly states in the United States.2 When the Supreme Court3 de-
cided Hurst v. Florida4 in January 2016,5 it became clear that Flor-
ida had been imposing unconstitutional sentences of death for dec-
ades.6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida uprooted 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.7 
 
 1 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (“hold[ing] that the imposition and carrying out of 
the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 2 See Death Sentences in the United States Since 1977, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-pre-
sent (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). For ease of discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court 
is referenced as “the Supreme Court.” 
 3  Throughout this article “Supreme Court” will refer to the United States Su-
preme Court; “Florida Supreme Court” or “the Supreme Court of Florida” will 
refer to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.  
 4 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 5 See DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH 
ROW U.S.A. FALL 2019, at 5 (2019), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/up-
loads/DRUSAFall2019.pdf; Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). 
 6 Compare Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (holding Florida’s sentencing 
scheme unconstitutional), with FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141(1)–(3) (1972) (Florida’s 
sentencing scheme that was found unconstitutional in Hurst v. Florida). 
 7 See generally Melanie Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade: The Aftermath of 
Hurst v. Florida & Why the Storm is Likely to Continue, 74 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
CAVEAT 37 (2020) [hereinafter Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade] (explaining 
how Hurst v. Florida affected Florida’s capital sentencing scheme and potential 
future issues that the decision may have created). 
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Hurst v. Florida impacted both Florida’s state courts and the 
Eleventh Circuit—the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over Flor-
ida.8 In attempting to defeat a sentence of death or pending death 
warrant, Florida defendants almost always raise federal habeas 
claims,9 which are often appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.10 
When the Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida, Florida’s 
death row housed approximately 390 defendants awaiting execu-
tion11—their sentences having been imposed under Florida’s now-
unconstitutional sentencing scheme.12 Also, at that time Florida was 
one of only three states in the country—accompanied by Delaware 
and Alabama, another state within the Eleventh Circuit—that had 
 
 8 See, e.g., Lambrix v. Secretary, DOC, 872 F.3d 1170, 1182 (11th Cir. 
2017) (“No U.S. Supreme Court decision holds that its Hurst decision is retroac-
tively applicable.”); Rivera v. State, 260 So. 3d 920, 927 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam) 
(holding that “[b]ecause [the defendant’s] conviction and sentence were final long 
before Ring was issued, our precedent makes it clear that he is not entitled to any 
Hurst relief.”). 
 9 Cf. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS 
LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 64 (2007), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. 
 10 See, e.g., Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 936 F.3d 1322, 1341 (11th Cir. 
2019) (affirming “the district court’s denial of [defendant’s] federal habeas peti-
tion.”). For more information on post-warrant litigation, see generally Melanie 
Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch: The Procedural 
Trap Capital Defendants Face in Raising Execution-Related Claims, U. PA. J.L. 
& PUB. AFF., June 2020, at 1 [hereinafter Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death 
Row and Death Watch]. 
 11 Lizette Alvarez, Supreme Court Ruling Has Florida Scrambling to Fix 
Death Penalty Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
02/03/us/supreme-court-ruling-has-florida-scrambling-to-fix-death-penalty-
law.html; see also Matt Ford, What’s Next for Florida’s Death Row?, ATLANTIC 
(May 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/whats-next-
for-floridas-death-row/481572/; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes Down Part 
of Florida Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/01/13/us/politics/supreme-court-death-penalty-hurst-v-flor-
ida.html. 
 12 See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016); see also Liptak, supra 
note 11; Hurst v. Florida, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/Hurst_v_Florida_Background (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).  
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not amended their laws to require the twelve-member jury’s unani-
mous recommendation for death before the trial court could sen-
tence a defendant to death.13 
After Hurst v. Florida, the Florida Legislature enacted a new 
capital sentencing scheme that complies with the new standards.14 
The resulting changes lead to a renewed emphasis on constitution-
ality and uniformity in capital sentencing. These changes, which the 
Eleventh Circuit has been called upon to review and implement, 
caused nationwide effects. For example, Delaware placed a morato-
rium on capital sentencing,15 thereby leaving Alabama (another state 
within the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction) as the only state in the 
country that does not require a jury’s unanimous recommendation 
for death before allowing trial courts to sentence defendants to 
death.16 
Thus, reviewing the demographics of Florida’s capital sentenc-
ing scheme is important in understanding one of the nation’s largest 
capital sentencing systems. Scholars have studied the demographics 
 
 13 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-43 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (West 
2016); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2016); see also Wrongful Capital Convictions 
May Be More Likely in Cases of Judicial Override, Non-Unanimous Death Ver-
dicts, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2016), https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/news/wrongful-capital-convictions-may-be-more-likely-in-cases-of-
judicial-override-non-unanimous-death-verdicts (“The Delaware Supreme Court 
has struck down its sentencing statute in light of Hurst in August 2016, leaving 
Florida and Alabama as the only states that still permit non-unanimous jury rec-
ommendations of death.”). 
 14 See S.B. 280, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017) (“requiring jury unanim-
ity . . . for a sentencing recommendation of death”). On remand from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 
40, 44–45 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam), holding that the jury’s recommendation for 
death must be unanimous. That decision led to Florida’s new statute. Although 
the Supreme Court of Florida receded from Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, in State 
v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020) (per curiam), in 
early 2020, the new statute has not been amended since Poole. For more on the 
rapid changes in Florida jurisprudence since Hurst v. Florida, see Kalmanson, 
Storm of the Decade, supra note 7. 
 15 See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del. 2016) (per curiam) (explaining, 
in finding the Delaware death penalty statute unconstitutional, that “Hurst 
prompted the question of whether [Delaware’s] death penalty statute sufficiently 
respects a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.”). 
 16 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-43 (2020). 
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of death row populations in various states.17 These studies are im-
portant because, “[c]ontrary to normative expectations and numer-
ous legal guidelines that have been established to channel the dis-
cretion of state officials, the [state] administration of capital punish-
ment remains an imperfect embodiment of the promise of govern-
mental power.”18 Literature has long suggested, “in addition to enu-
merated statutory factors, extra-legal variables such as race, gender, 
and location are potentially important independent determinants 
linking case facts with a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death pen-
alty.”19 Determining, or at least analyzing, the effect of bias in cap-
ital sentencing is even more important in light of the recent consti-
tutional crisis Hurst v. Florida created.20 
Considering the significance of Florida’s capital sentencing sys-
tem as a leader in American capital punishment,21 this Article ana-
lyzes the empirical demographics of Florida’s death row as of Janu-
ary 2016, which consisted of defendants awaiting execution under 
unconstitutional sentences of death, as determined in Hurst v. Flor-
ida and further contemplated by the Supreme Court of Florida.22  
 
 17 E.g., Hemant Sharma et al., Race and the Death Penalty: An Empirical 
Assessment of First Degree Murder Convictions in Tennessee After Gregg v. 
Georgia, 2 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 1 (2013); Michael J. Songer & 
Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions 
to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161 (2006). 
 18 Songer & Unah, supra note 17, at 162. 
 19 Id. at 168. 
 20 See generally Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade, supra note 7, at 39 (refer-
ring to Hurst v. Florida as a “hurricanic constitutional event”). 
 21 See Death Sentences in the United States Since 1977, supra note 2. 
 22 See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619, 624 (2016) (holding that Florida’s 
sentencing scheme, which dictated Timothy Hurst’s death sentence, was uncon-
stitutional). The author does not purport to be an expert in analyzing data and does 
not contend that the statistics reported in this Article are statistically significant. 
Rather, this Article reviews the data on its face and used a very simple methodol-
ogy to do so. At the time this author drafted this Article, this Article was the first 
of its kind in reviewing the demographics of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. 
However, since this Article was accepted for publication, Hannah L. Gorman and 
Margot Ravenscroft published their article Hurricane Florida: The Hot and Cold 
Fronts of America’s, 51 COL. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 938 (2020), as part of Co-
lumbia Human Rights Law Review’s Symposium regarding the important topic of 
issues the capital sentencing system has faced since Furman. Like this Article, 
their article also reviews how Hurst v. Florida affected Florida’s death row in 
terms of numbers. The author urges readers to read that Article in conjunction 
with this Article, as this author believes they complement each other well. To the 
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Part I explains the necessary precedential landscape for review-
ing Florida’s capital sentencing system. To contextualize statistics 
surrounding Florida’s imposition of the death penalty, Part II re-
views the demographics of all defendants convicted of a homicide 
offense in Florida, specifically, first-degree murder. In doing so, 
Part II concludes—consistent with other studies—that gender and 
race are factors upon which murder/manslaughter defendants are 
discriminated against, but age is not. Men are consistently prose-
cuted harsher than women,23 and non-Whites are generally prose-
cuted harsher than Whites.24 
Part III reviews the demographics of defendants sentenced to 
death in Florida. In this context, the gender discrimination found in 
Part II appears consistent; however, the racial discrimination does 
not. Part III concludes that, if anything, Whites are sentenced to 
death more often than Blacks when compared to the total population 
of defendants convicted of murder/manslaughter offenses. Next, 
Part IV reviews the demographics of defendants executed in Florida 
before Hurst v. Florida. Ultimately, it is clear that the racial, age, 
and ethnic makeup of Florida’s death row and, more specifically, 
those who are executed in Florida is almost completely unpredicta-
ble—suggesting the absence of discrimination in capital sentencing 
and executions. 
Finally, Part V analyzes the defendants who were awaiting exe-
cution on Florida’s death row when the Supreme Court decided 
Hurst v. Florida, specifically within the context of the framework 
set forth by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on remand in 
 
extent the numbers presented in this Article differ from the numbers presented in 
Gorman and Ravenscroft’s article, there is likely a reasonable explanation—either 
due to different methodology, starting from a different set of data, or otherwise. 
That being said, to the extent there is any material difference, this author defers 
to the numbers in Gorman and Ravenscroft’s article, as those are the numbers 
practitioners in Florida have used. 
 23 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (expressing perplexity regarding the “favored treatment” that 
women have gotten compared to the treatment that men have gotten in receiving 
the death penalty). 
 24 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1986) (McCleskey “argue[d] 
that race ha[d] infected the administration of Georgia’s statute [because] . . . black 
murderers are more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers.”). 
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Hurst v. State25 and its progeny regarding the application of Hurst 
v. Florida. This Part finds, in empirical terms, that the Florida Su-
preme Court’s retroactivity framework26 split Florida’s death row in 
half as to who was eligible for Hurst v. Florida relief. Further, this 
Part explains the practical significance of Florida requiring unanim-
ity in the jury’s final recommendation for death—at least for the few 
years that it did between the Hurst decisions and the Court’s deci-
sion in January 2020 in State v. Poole that receded from Hurst v. 
State.27 
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY OF FLORIDA’S CAPITAL SENTENCING 
SCHEME 
In 1972, the Supreme Court hit the “reset” button on modern 
capital sentencing in its landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,28 
which invalidated “the death penalty statutes of thirty-nine states 
and the federal government.”29 The per curiam decision in Furman 
merely held “that the imposition and carrying out of the death pen-
alty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”30 Then, in nine 
separate, additional opinions in Furman, the Justices explained their 
individual reasoning for reaching this result.31 In Furman, several 
 
 25 See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44–45 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam), receded 
from by State v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020) (per 
curiam). 
 26 See, e.g., Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 15–22 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (re-
fusing to apply Hurst v. Florida retroactively to defendant’s death sentence based 
on a lengthy retroactivity analysis); Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla. 
2017) (per curiam) (holding that because defendant’s death sentence came before 
Ring, Hurst v. Florida retroactivity did not apply); Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 
1248 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (applying Hurst-based retroactivity analysis that 
considers the retroactivity frameworks that other cases set out). 
 27 See Poole, 2020 WL 370302 at *1. 
 28 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 29 Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2007). For more information on the extensive history of capital sentencing in the 
United States before Furman, see generally CAROL STEIKER & JORDAN STEIKER, 
COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016). 
 30 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
 31 See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 
314 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 
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justices discussed evidence of bias and discrimination in American 
capital sentencing.32 
As to the effect of Furman, one author wrote that the decision 
was “a seemingly perfect example of the Court’s ability and incli-
nation to protect capital defendants when no one else will.”33 Others, 
such as Carol and Jordan Steiker, argue that the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to employ the Constitution in addressing capital sen-
tencing ultimately led to the destabilization of the American capital 
punishment system.34 
Reacting to Furman, in Donaldson v. Sack, the Supreme Court 
of Florida commuted all previously imposed death sentences to sen-
tences of life imprisonment.35 Following Donaldson, convicted cap-
ital defendants were automatically sentenced to life imprisonment36 
until the Florida Legislature reenacted the death penalty in Decem-
ber 1972.37 
Shortly after Donaldson, in July 1973, the Supreme Court of 
Florida determined that Furman did not abolish capital punishment 
 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 32 Id. at 249–50 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that the President’s Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded that “there 
is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing 
power by the courts and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death 
sentence is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, 
and the members of unpopular groups.”); id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(finding a strong inference that the death penalty was “not being regularly and 
fairly applied.”); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[I]f any basis can be dis-
cerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitution-
ally impermissible basis of race.”); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) (“Legislative 
‘policy’ is thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by 
what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon 
them.”); id. at 364–66 (Marshall, J., concurring) (writing that the American capital 
sentencing system discriminated against Negroes, men, “the poor, the ignorant, 
and the under privileged members of society.”). 
 33 Lain, supra note 29, at 1. 
 34 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 29, at 255–89 (arguing that “[t]he Ameri-
can death penalty is currently more vulnerable than it has been at any point since 
its revival in 1976.”). 
 35 Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499, 502–03 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam); see 
also John Spittler, Jr., Florida Death Penalty: A Lack of Discretion, 28 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 723, 724 (1974). 
 36 Donaldson, 265 So. 2d at 502–03. 
 37 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1972). 
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but, rather, held that “the quality of discretion and the manner in 
which it was applied . . . dictated the rule of law which constitutes 
Furman v. Georgia” or the constitutionality of a capital sentencing 
scheme.38 Reviewing the new statute that the Florida Legislature en-
acted in December 1972, the Supreme Court of Florida determined 
that the statute properly reserved the death penalty for “only the 
most aggravated and unmitigated of most serious crimes.”39 Thus, 
the Court determined that Florida could resume capital sentencing.40 
Similarly, the Supreme Court soon back-pedaled and declared 
that the death penalty was, in fact, a viable punishment.41 In 1976, 
in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held “that the death penalty 
is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless 
of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of 
the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching 
the decision to impose it.”42 Thus, after Gregg, death was a viable 
punishment so long as it was enacted by each state’s legislature and 
imposed with discretion, after consideration of each defendant’s in-
dividual characteristics.43 
But how effective were Furman and the Supreme Court’s sev-
eral subsequent opinions at eliminating arbitrariness and bias in the 
imposition of the death penalty? Professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
wrote that Furman was the beginning of a decades-long series of 
decisions by the Supreme Court that, while each “notable in itself, 
together . . . indicate a Court that has become quite concerned about 
the administration of the death penalty.”44 
For example, fifteen years after Furman, the Supreme Court 
made clear in McCleskey v. Kemp that prosecutorial and judicial dis-
cretion are advantageous to a capital defendant: 
Not only can a jury decline to impose the death sen-
tence, it can decline to convict or choose to convict 
of a lesser offense. . . . [A] prosecutor can decline to 
 
 38 State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1973) (per curiam). 
 39 Id. at 7. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. at 186–87. 
 44 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court and the Death Penalty, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1367, 1367 (2006). 
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charge, offer a plea bargain, or decline to seek a 
death sentence in any particular case. Of course, “the 
power to be lenient [also] is the power to discrimi-
nate,” but a capital punishment system that did not 
allow for discretionary acts of leniency “would be to-
tally alien to our notions of criminal justice.”45 
Likewise, in 2000, the Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guaran-
tees criminal defendants the right to a jury finding that each element 
of the crime for which the defendant is charged was proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.46 Apprendi initiated a sort of snowball effect of 
expanding or clarifying capital defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
rights, which ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hurst v. Florida in 2016.47 
Two years after Apprendi, in Ring v. Arizona,  the Supreme 
Court applied Apprendi to capital defendants, holding that a jury, 
rather than a judge, must find the factors necessary for the death 
penalty to be imposed.48 Although Ring would ultimately become a 
turning point for capital sentencing in Florida,49 upon initial re-
view—despite similarities between Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme and Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme that the Court in-
validated in Ring—the Supreme Court of Florida, over several Jus-
tices’ dissents, refused to apply Ring to Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme. The majority of the Court held that Florida’s capital sen-
tencing scheme remained valid under the Sixth Amendment, despite 
Ring.50 
 
 45 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311–12 (1987) (citation omitted). 
 46 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–77 (2000). 
 47 See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016) (explaining how the rea-
soning in Apprendi was applied in subsequent death penalty cases). 
 48 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); see also Chemerinsky, supra 
note 44, at 1373 (“In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied its recent decision in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey and held that the jury, not the judge, must find the factors 
that warrant imposition of capital punishment.”) (citations omitted). 
 49 See 136 S. Ct. at 621–22 (finding that the analysis in Ring is applicable to 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme and, therefore, the capital sentencing scheme 
in Florida violates the Sixth Amendment). 
 50 Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 694–95 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). 
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For years, capital defendants in Florida unsuccessfully sought 
relief under Ring.51 Defendants argued that Florida’s capital sen-
tencing scheme was unconstitutional under Ring for (1) not requir-
ing the jury to make the requisite findings required to impose a sen-
tence of death, including each aggravating factor; and (2) requiring 
only a majority of the twelve-member jury to recommend death, ra-
ther than unanimity.52 Nevertheless, capital sentencing in Florida 
continued. Linroy Bottoson was executed on December 9, 2002—
less than six months after the Supreme Court decided Ring.53 
Finally, fourteen years after Ring, the Supreme Court agreed to 
review whether Florida’s capital sentencing scheme met the consti-
tutional demands of the Sixth Amendment.54 In Hurst v. Florida, the 
Supreme Court validated the argument defendants had presented un-
successfully for years, determining that the analysis from Ring ap-
plied equally to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.55 The Court 
held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional 
under the Sixth Amendment and remanded to the Florida Supreme 
Court.56 
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court held in Hurst v. State 
that the Sixth Amendment, as well as article I, section 22, of the 
Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution, require that “all the critical findings necessary before the trial 
court may consider imposing a sentence of death must be found 
unanimously by the jury.”57 As to Florida’s capital sentencing stat-
ute, the Court explained the following: 
In capital cases in Florida, these specific findings re-
quired to be made by the jury include the existence 
 
 51 See, e.g., Marshall v. Crosby, 911 So. 2d 1129, 1133–34, 1134 n.5 (Fla. 
2005) (per curiam) (“In over fifty cases since Ring’s release, we have rejected 
Ring claims.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Opening Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
at 25–28, Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (No. SC02-1455). 
 53 Linroy Bottoson, CLARK PROSECUTOR, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/ 
html/death/US/bottoson813.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). 
 54 See 136 S. Ct. at 621. 
 55 See id. at 621–22. 
 56 Id. at 624. 
 57 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44, 59 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) receded from 
by State v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020) (per cu-
riam). 
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of each aggravating factor that has been proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the finding that the aggra-
vating factors are sufficient, and the finding that the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances. . . . [Also,] in order for the trial court to im-
pose a sentence of death, the jury’s recommended 
sentence of death must be unanimous.58 
Further, unlike its reaction to Furman, the Florida Supreme 
Court determined that Florida Statutes did not require the court to 
commute all existing death sentences to a sentence of life imprison-
ment.59 Rather, the Court determined the appropriate relief for a 
harmful Hurst v. Florida error is a new penalty phase.60 Finally, the 
Court determined that Hurst v. Florida applied retroactively only to 
sentences of death that became final after Ring.61 On the basis of this 
framework, numerous defendants were granted resentencing pro-
ceedings, many of whom were resentenced to life.62 
However, at the end of January 2020, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida receded from its decision in Hurst v. State.63 In State v. Poole, 
 
 58 Id. at 44. 
 59 Id. at 64–65. 
 60 Id. at 69; see Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 173–75 (Fla. 2016) (per cu-
riam); see also Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 885–86 (Fla. 2019) (per curiam); 
Evans v. State, 213 So. 3d 856, 859 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam). For more on the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s analysis of Hurst harmless error, see Kalmanson, 
Storm of the Decade, supra note 7, at 45–47. 
 61 See Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam); Asay 
v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam); Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 
1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam). For more on the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
analysis of the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and why it may not be the final 
framework, see Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade, supra note 7, at 47–49. Note, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit held in early 2020 that in federal habeas proceed-
ings Hurst v. Florida does not apply retroactively to any defendants. Knight v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 936 F.3d 1322, 1338 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 62 See, e.g., Sexton v. State, 221 So. 3d 547, 559 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam); see 
also Steve Bousquet, Murderers Leave Florida’s Death Row After Hurst Ruling; 
System ‘A Mess,’ Expert Says, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 3, 2017), 
https://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/murderers-leave-flori-
das-death-row-after-hurst-ruling-system-a-mess-expert/2329030/. 
 63 See State v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302, at *15 (Fla. Jan. 23, 
2020) (per curiam) (“Having thoroughly considered the State’s and Poole’s argu-
ments in light of the applicable law, we recede from Hurst v. State except to the 
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the Supreme Court of Florida held that the Court erred in its holding 
in Hurst.64 Again upending Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, the 
Supreme Court of Florida held that the only finding a jury must 
unanimously make in a capital sentencing proceeding is “the exist-
ence of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances.”65 The 
Court explained that “[n]either Hurst v. Florida, nor the Sixth or 
Eighth Amendment, nor the Florida Constitution mandates that the 
jury” make any other statutory finding or recommend a sentence of 
death.66 What Poole actually means for Florida’s capital sentencing 
laws and death row inmates remains to be seen.67 
Based on this legal history, Parts II through IV analyze data re-
garding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, exploring any indica-
tion of discrimination in Florida’s death penalty both before and af-
ter Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State (collectively “Hurst”). Part V 
then reviews how Hurst and its progeny affected defendants who 
were on death row when Hurst was decided. 
II. DEFENDANTS CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE OFFENSES 
In fiscal year 2014–2015, the Florida Department of Corrections 
(“DOC”) reported 942 admissions for homicide offenses (“mur-
der/manslaughter”).68 These admissions comprised 3.1% of DOC’s 
total admissions that year.69 The next year, DOC reported 987 ad-
 
extent it requires a jury unanimously to find the existence of a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 64 Id. at *11–13, 15. 
 65 Id. at *11. 
 66 Id. at *11. 
 67 Cf. Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade, supra note 7, at 39–40, 67 (predict-
ing, just before Poole, that future decisions would create future storms of litigation 
related to Hurst). 
 68 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014–2015, at 27 
(2015) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015], http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ 
annual/1415/FDC_AR2014-15.pdf. 
 69 Id. As far as methodology for the statistics cited herein, I used the raw data 
from the Florida Department of Corrections—number of inmates in most in-
stances—to calculate statistics in a way that is understandable and communicable. 
For example, to calculate this statistic, I would divide the total number of DOC 
admissions for fiscal year 2014–2015 by 942, which produces .031, which can 
then be converted to a percentage of total admissions. 
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missions for murder/manslaughter—3.3% of DOC’s total admis-
sions that year.70 Of those 987 admissions for murder/manslaughter 
in fiscal year 2015–2016, 323 (or 32.7%) were admitted for first-
degree murder,71 the only murder offense for which death is a viable 
punishment in Florida.72 In other words, 1.07% (32.7% of 3.3%) of 
DOC admissions for fiscal year 2015–2016 were for first-degree 
murder. 
On June 30, 2015, DOC reported 14,576 inmates in custody for 
the primary offense of murder/manslaughter, which accounted for 
14.6% of DOC’s inmate population at that time.73 A year later, DOC 
reported 14,722 inmates for the primary offense of murder/man-
slaughter, accounting for 14.9% of DOC’s inmate population at that 
time74—an increase of 0.3% from the prior year. Of those 14,722 
inmates, 7,275 inmates were in custody for the specific primary of-
fense of first-degree murder.75 Therefore, in 2016, first-degree mur-
der was the primary offense for 7.3% of inmates within DOC’s gen-
eral population, and 49.4% of defendants incarcerated for mur-
der/manslaughter were incarcerated for the primary offense of first-
degree murder. 
This Part reviews the demographic information of these defend-
ants admitted to DOC for murder/manslaughter—specifically, (A) 
the age of homicide defendants, (B) the gender of homicide defend-
ants, and (C) the race of homicide defendants. Note that this Part 
does not consider the sentences each defendant received for their 
conviction, which is discussed in Part III, infra. 
 
 70 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015–2016, at 27, 
(2016) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016], http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ 
annual/1516/FDC_AR2015-16.pdf. 
 71 See FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., Inmate Admissions: Admissions by Primary Of-
fenses FY 2015-16, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia 
_primary.html (last visited July 26, 2017)  https://web.archive.org/web/20170 
726160536/http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia_primary.html] 
[hereinafter Admissions: Primary Offenses]. 
 72 See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 921.141 (2016). 
 73 ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 28. 
 74 ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70, at 28. 
 75 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., Inmate Population, http://www.dc.state 
.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ip_primary.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170827110347/http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ann
ual/1516/stats/ip_primary.html] [hereinafter Inmate Population]. 
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A. Age of Defendants 
This Section reviews the age of defendants when they were ad-
mitted to DOC for homicide offenses. Admissions give an accurate 
depiction of this information because it is the defendant’s age at the 
time he or she is imprisoned for the crime, which is closest to the 
time of the offense. 
In fiscal year 2014–2015, the average age of all defendants ad-
mitted to DOC for murder/manslaughter was 34.3 years.76 That age 
dropped by 1.4 years in fiscal year 2015–2016, when the average 
age of the 987 defendants admitted to DOC for murder/manslaugh-
ter was 32.9 years77 On June 30, 2016, the average age of all defend-
ants in DOC’s population for murder/manslaughter was 28.4 
years.78 This indicates that the defendants admitted for murder/man-
slaughter between 2014 and 2016 were, on average, older than all 
defendants in DOC’s population.79 
In fiscal year 2015–2016, of the 987 admissions for mur-
der/manslaughter, 118 or 12% were “elderly” (50 years of age or 
older), 81 or 8.2% were “youthful” (17 years of age or younger), 
leaving 788 or 79.8% of all defendants admitted to DOC for mur-
der/manslaughter between the ages of 17 and 50.80 Table 1 below 




 76 ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 27. 
 77 Compare id., with ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70 at 27. 
 78 ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70 at 27. 
 79 Compare FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., Inmate Population: General Characteris-
tics of Population, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ 
ip_general.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170827110531/http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ip_gen-
eral.html] [hereinafter Population: General], with ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, 
supra note 68, at 27l, and ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70 at 27. 
 80 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., Inmate Admissions: Elderly (50 or Older) Admis-
sions, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia_elderly.html (last vis-
ited July 26, 2017) [https://web.archive.org/web/20170726161143/http:// 
www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia_elderly.html] [hereinafter Admis-
sions: Elderly 2015–16]; FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., Inmate Admissions: Youthful (17 
or Under at Offense) Admissions, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/ 
1516/stats/ia_youthful.html (last visited July 26, 2017) [https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20170726161158/http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia_youth-
ful.html] [hereinafter Admissions: Youthful 2015–16]. 
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Murder/Manslaughter  
Admissions (2015–16) 
Youthful 81 8.2% 
Elderly 118 12% 
18–50 788 79.8% 
Total 987 
Table 1: Age of DOC Admissions for Murder, Manslaughter 
(2015–16) 
 
On July 1, 2016, 20.1% of Florida’s general population was 
younger than eighteen, and 19.9% of the population was older than 
sixty-five.81 Comparing this to the data above, there is no indication 
that youthful or elderly people are committing, or at least being im-
prisoned for, homicide offenses disproportionately to Florida’s gen-
eral population. If anything, both youthful and elderly people are 
committing homicide offenses less than the population distribution 
would suggest. This seems natural because there will usually be a 
law-abiding portion of the population. Thus, there appears to be no 
indication that age is a basis for discriminatory prosecution or con-
viction in Florida. 
Further, it is worth noting that the average age of female offend-
ers at the time of admission was 36.5 years old82—almost four years 
older than the average age of all defendants admitted for mur-
der/manslaughter in the same year.83 This may indicate that the 
women who commit homicide offenses do so later in life when com-
pared to male offenders. Section B below reviews the gender of de-
fendants imprisoned for homicide offenses in Florida. 
 
 81 JIM FARRELL, CENT. FLA. DEV. COUNCIL 3 (2017), https://cfdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/Demographics-Analysis-for-Polk-County-2017.pdf [hereinafter 
FLORIDA CENSUS DATA]. 
 82 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., Inmate Admissions: Female Offender Admissions, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia_female.html (last visited July 
6, 2017) [https://web.archive.org/web/20170625085205/http://www.dc.state.fl. 
us/pub/annual/1516/stats/ia_female.html] [hereinafter Admissions: Female]. 
 83 ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70, at 27. 
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B. Gender of Defendants 
As to gender, literature suggests that, in general, men are ar-
rested, victimized, and incarcerated more often than women.84 In 
2012, Professor Sonja Starr of the University of Michigan wrote that 
“[i]n the United States, men are fifteen times as likely to be incar-
cerated as women are.”85 Table 2 below reflects the gender compo-
sition of Florida’s population as compared to DOC’s general popu-














Male 48.9% 93.1% 93.4% 95.6% 
Female 51.1% 6.9% 6.6% 4.4% 
Table 2: Gender Composition of Florida and DOC Population 
(2016)86 
 
According to this information, men are almost twice as likely as 
women to be imprisoned for crime. This is consistent with evidence 
that men generally commit violent offenses more often than 
women.87 Further, women are slightly underrepresented compared 
to the general DOC population and the DOC’s murder/manslaughter 
population.88 In addition, women were underrepresented by 2.5% in 
the first-degree murder population, which is 2.2% less compared to 
the murder/manslaughter population.89 
 
 84 E.g., J.L. Miller et al., Perceptions of Justice: Race and Gender Differences 
in Judgments of Appropriate Prison Sentences, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 313, 317 
(1986). 
 85 Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases 
1 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-018, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144002. 
 86 FLORIDA CENSUS DATA, supra note 81, at 3; Population: General, supra 
note 79; Inmate Population, supra note 75. 
 87 See e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Gender Gap Trends for Violent 
Crimes, 1980 to 2003, 1 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 72, 89–90 (2006). 
 88 Compare Population: General, supra note 79, with Inmate Population, su-
pra note 75. Obviously, the murder/manslaughter population is not exhaustive of 
the population incarcerated for violent offenses. 
 89 See Inmate Population, supra note 75. 
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In fiscal year 2015–2016, 8.8% (87 out of 987) of defendants 
admitted to DOC for murder/manslaughter were women.90 There-
fore, 2.2% more women were admitted to DOC in 2015–2016 for 
murder/manslaughter, as compared to the DOC population for the 
primary offense of murder/manslaughter, of which 6.6% was 
women.91 
Going a step further and looking only to the 323 defendants ad-
mitted for first-degree murder, males comprised 93.8% of the ad-
missions for first-degree murder in 2015–2016, accounting for 303 
or 93.8% of the defendants.92 Only 20, or 6.2%, of first-degree mur-
der defendants were female, 2.6% less than the percentage of female 
representation in all murder/manslaughter admissions for the same 
year.93 Table 3 below summarizes the information presented in this 
Section regarding the gender of defendants admitted to DOC for 










Men 93.1% 900 91.1% 303 93.8% 
Women 6.9% 87 8.8% 20 6.2% 
Total  987 323 
Table 3: Gender of DOC Admissions (2015–2016) 
 
Based on this information, it appears that women commit more 
non-capital homicide offenses than capital offenses. To the contrary, 
it appears that men are convicted of capital crimes more often than 
women. These findings support what Justice Marshall suggested in 
 
 90 See Admissions: Female, supra note 82; Admissions: Primary Offenses, 
supra note 71. 
 91 See Admissions: Female, supra note 82; Inmate Population, supra note 75; 
Population: General, supra note 79; see also supra Table 2. 
 92 See Admissions: Primary Offenses, supra note 71; see also infra Table 3. 
 93 Admissions: Primary Offenses, supra note 71; Admissions: Female, supra 
note 82. 
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Furman,94 and what other authors have argued since: women gener-
ally receive more lenient convictions and sentences.95  
The next Section addresses the racial composition of the popu-
lation of defendants convicted of homicide offenses. 
C. Race of Defendants 
For decades, discussions about the death penalty have addressed 
whether racial discrimination affects capital sentencing in the 
United States.96 Indeed, evidence of racial disparities in capital sen-
tencing was one of the primary reasons for the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Furman.97 Many have and would still argue that discre-
tion in the capital sentencing process—for example, prosecutorial 
discretion to decide whether to seek death in a capital prosecution,98 
jury discretion to recommend life or death, and judicial discretion to 
impose life or death—results in racial discrimination.99 In other 
words, discretion is employed in a racially discriminatory manner 
against Blacks, resulting in a system that disproportionately sen-
tences Blacks to death for crimes identical to those committed by 
Whites, for which a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is 
imposed. 
 
 94 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (“There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is 
employed against men and not women. Only 32 women have been executed since 
1930, while 3,827 men have met a similar fate.”). 
 95 See e.g., Victor L. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for 
Women, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 609, 613–15, 620–27 (2006). 
 96 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 56 (2010) (discussing the 
advent of “mass incarceration” of African Americans, partly exacerbated by the 
introduction of dozens of new federal capital crimes in 1994). 
 97 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 249–51 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 98 See John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: 
Creating a Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2571, 2576 (1997) (“Although the dangers of prosecutorial discretion ex-
ist throughout the criminal process, they are most problematic in the context of 
the death penalty, where prosecutors are likely to have the greatest influence on 
whether a defendant is sentenced to death.”). 
 99 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987) (arguing, in part, 
that “race has infected the administration of Georgia’s statute [because] . . . black 
murderers are more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers.”); Aya 
Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 156–57 
(2014); Sharma et al., supra note 17, at 4. 
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Others argue that race inevitably plays a role in capital sentenc-
ing.100 Some argue that the victim’s race is the determinative factor 
when reviewing whether discrimination exists in capital sentenc-
ing.101 Indeed, this was the basis of the equal protection claim in 
McCleskey.102 Likewise, in his dissent from the Florida Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Asay v. State (“Asay V”), former Justice Perry 
noted that Mark James Asay, the first defendant to have a death war-
rant issued by the Governor of Florida after Hurst,103 would “be the 
first white person executed for the murder of a black person in [Flor-
ida].”104 Justice Perry stated, “This sad statistic is a reflection of the 
bitter reality that the death penalty is applied in a biased and dis-
criminatory fashion, even today.”105 
Finally, some argue that we have effectively reduced the im-
proper influence of race, and the “death penalty system is no longer 
characterized by the systemic discrimination against Black defend-
ants that existed in many states before Furman v. Georgia.”106 This 
Section reviews the racial composition of DOC’s population of de-
fendants admitted for homicide offenses, setting the background for 
later discussion reviewing race in capital sentencing. 
1. DOC GENERAL POPULATION 
On June 30, 2016, DOC reported a total population of 99,119 
inmates.107 Blacks comprised the highest percentage of that popula-
tion at 48.1%; Whites comprised 47.6%; other races comprised the 
remaining 4.5%.108 On July 1, 2016, one day after DOC’s report, the 
 
 100 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292; see also Race and the Death Penalty, AM. 
C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 
29, 2020) (“The color of a defendant and victim’s skim plays a crucial and unac-
ceptable role in deciding who receives the death penalty in America.”). 
 101 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 (defendant arguing, in part that “persons 
who murder whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who 
murder blacks”). 
 102 See id. 
 103 See Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 699 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam). 
 104 Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 37 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (Perry, J., dissent-
ing). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Sharma et al., supra note 17, at 3. 
 107 ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70, at 24. 
 108 Population: General, supra note 79. 
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population of the State of Florida was 20,612,439.109 Table 4 below 
summarizes and compares the racial composition of Florida’s pop-






Black 16.8% 48% 
White 77.6% 47.5% 
Other 5.6% 4.5% 
Table 4: Racial Composition of DOC and Florida Population 
(2016) 
 
Considering this information, Blacks are overrepresented in 
Florida’s prisons by a staggering 31.2%. To the contrary, Whites are 
underrepresented in Florida’s prisons by 30.1%, and other races are 
slightly underrepresented by approximately 1%. The question is 
whether this is a result of Blacks committing crimes at a dispropor-
tionately higher rate than Whites, or something else, such as racial 
bias in prosecutions and/or convictions. 
Obviously, extraneous factors—socioeconomics, education, 
etc.—may affect whether someone commits or is victimized by a 
crime.110 For example, uneducated and unskilled people, regardless 
of race, are less likely to secure employment and may be more in-
clined to commit crime as a result of economic deprivation.111 In 
2016, the poverty rate in Florida was 14.7%, down from 15.7% in 
2015.112 However, when viewed by race, the poverty rate 
 
 109 FLORIDA CENSUS DATA, supra note 81, at 3. 
 110 See, e.g., John A. Arthur, Socioeconomic Predictors of Crime in Rural 
Georgia, 16 CRIM. JUST. REV. 29, 36 (1991) (finding “that socioeconomic varia-
bles such as unemployment, poverty, percentage of families receiving aid, and 
race have significant, positive effect on violent crimes and property crime at the 
county level” in South Georgia); see also Jason DeParle, The American Prison 
Nightmare, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 238, 239–40 (2007) (“[B]y 2009, high 
school dropouts of either race were being locked up three as often as they had 
been two decades before.”). 
 111 See Arthur, supra note 110, at 36–37. 
 112 Poverty Rate in Florida from 2000 to 2016, STATISTA, https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/205451/poverty-rate-in-florida/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020); 
see also Florida, Poverty by State, TALKPOVERTY, https://talkpoverty.org/state-
year-report/florida-2017-report/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
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changes.113 Table 5 below indicates the percentage of Florida’s pop-
ulation that was in poverty in 2016 by race/ethnicity, as compared 
to the overall Florida and DOC populations. 
 
 Percent of Florida  





Black 22.8% 16.8% 48% 
White 12.8% 77.6% 47.5% 
Table 5: Poverty Rates by Race 
 
Thus, in Florida, Blacks experience poverty at a higher rate than 
Whites. Based on this information, we may expect Blacks to be im-
prisoned slightly more than Whites. But should we expect them to 
be imprisoned over 30% more than their population representation 
would suggest? 
Sources indicate that “criminal justice laws and policies dispro-
portionately incarcerate African Americans.”114 In addition, data 
shows that Blacks are disproportionately victimized by crime.115 
Even considering the disparity in poverty rates, “blacks are twice as 
likely as whites to be unemployed, [but] they now go to prison eight 
times as often.”116 Furthermore, while “[m]uch about black under-
class life is tragic . . . the racial imbalance in the prison population 
is particularly extreme.”117 Additionally, “Black men in their early 
thirties are imprisoned at seven times the rate of whites in the same 
age group.118 
Analyzing the DOC population suggests that, even considering 
disparities in poverty, Blacks are generally imprisoned dispropor-
tionately more than Whites, in Florida. The next Section narrows in 
on defendants who are imprisoned in Florida for homicide offenses 
and, specifically, first-degree murder. 
 
 113 See Florida, Poverty by State, supra note 112. 
 114 E.g., Andrea C. Armstrong, Race, Prison Discipline, and the Law, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 759, 760 (2015) (citing generally ALEXANDER, supra note 96). 
 115 See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 84, at 317; Brenda L. Vogel & James W. 
Meeker, Perceptions of Crime Seriousness in Eight African-American Communi-
ties: The Influence of Individual, Environmental, and Crime-Based Factors, 18 
JUST. Q. 301, 302 (2001). 
 116 DeParle, supra note 110, at 240. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 239. 
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2. DEFENDANTS CONVICTED OF PRIMARY HOMICIDE OFFENSES 
Looking only at inmates imprisoned for the primary offense of 
murder/manslaughter, which includes first-degree murder, the dis-
proportionate conviction of Blacks versus Whites becomes more 
significant.119 Table 6 below summarizes the racial composition of 
the DOC population imprisoned for the primary offense of mur-






Black 7,414 50.4% 3,114 42.8% 
White 6,521 44.3% 3,810 52.4% 
Other 787 5.3% 351 4.8% 
Total 14,722 7,275 
Table 6: Race of Homicide Population 
 
Based on this information, Blacks comprise 2.4% more of the 
murder/manslaughter population than the DOC population in gen-
eral.120 Compared to the population of Florida, of which Blacks rep-
resent 16.8%,121 Blacks are overrepresented in the murder/man-
slaughter population by 33.6% and overrepresented in the first-de-
gree murder population by 26%.122 Thus, even if one adjusted for 
disproportionate rates of poverty and other factors that may instigate 
criminal behavior, an argument could still be made that: (A) Blacks 
are convicted of higher offenses more often than Whites, as are de-
fendants who are neither White nor Black; or (B) Whites are com-
mitting first-degree murder less often than Blacks and those listed 
as “Other.” 
However, not all first-degree murder defendants are sentenced 
to death.123 A significant portion of first-degree murder defendants 
are instead sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. In fact, in 2007, Songer and Unah wrote that between 1981 
 
 119 See Inmate Population, supra note 75. 
 120 Compare Population: General, supra note 79, with Inmate Population, su-
pra note 75. 
 121 See FLORIDA CENSUS DATA, supra note 81, at 3. 
 122 See Inmate Population, supra note 75. 
 123 John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Com-
position, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 165, 171 (2004). 
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and 2006, only “approximately 2% of murders committed by known 
offenders in the United States resulted in death sentences.”124 Part 
III below focuses on only those defendants convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to death in Florida. 
III. DEFENDANTS SENTENCED TO DEATH 
Florida has always been a leader in capital sentencing.125 It 
houses one of the largest death rows in the country.126 Between June 
30, 2011, and June 30, 2015, the DOC reported an average of 399 
inmates awaiting execution on Florida’s death row.127 That number 
peaked at 405 in 2013.128 
Historically, Florida has been a leader in the number of death 
sentences imposed each year;129 and, the State is unfortunately 
known for having more “exonerations from death row . . . than any 
other state.”130 When awaiting execution on “death row” in Flor-
ida,131 pending any appeals,132 the defendant lives in a death row cell 
that is 6 feet by 9 feet by 9.5 feet high.133 
Once the defendant’s appellate rights expire, the Governor signs 
a death warrant, certifying that the defendant may be executed and 
 
 124 Songer & Unah, supra note 117, at 162. 
 125 See Death Sentencing Graphs by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/sentencing-data/state-death-sen-
tences-by-year (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 126 See Death Row, supra note 5. 
 127 See ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 37. Specifically, on 
June 30, 2011, there were 399 inmates on Florida’s death row; on June 30, 2012, 
there were 402 inmates on death row in Florida; on June 30, 2013, there were 405 
inmates on death row in Florida; on June 30, 2014, there were 396 inmates on 
death row in Florida; and, on June 30, 2015, there were 395 inmates on death row 
in Florida. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Death Sentencing Graphs by State, supra note 125. 
 130 Florida, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
florida-1 (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 131 See Death Row, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/ 
deathrow.html  (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 132 See Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch, supra 
note 10, at 6–13 (describing the “long capital appellate process.”). 
 133 Death Row, supra note 5. 
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scheduling the execution.134 When the Governor signs the defend-
ant’s death warrant, the defendant is moved to a “Death Watch” cell, 
which is a bit larger than the former cell at 12 feet by 7 feet by 8.5 
feet high.135 According to the DOC’s 2014–2015 Annual Report, 
defendants spent an average of 17.2 years on death row between 
their offense and execution.136 
Section A below reviews the gender of defendants sentenced to 
death in Florida. 
A. Gender of Defendants 
Men and women on Florida’s death row are housed sepa-
rately.137 Men are housed at Florida State Prison and Union Correc-
tional Institution in Raiford, Florida.138 Women are housed at Low-
ell Correctional Institution Annex in Lowell, Florida.139 Table 8 be-
low shows the gender composition of Florida’s death row was as of 
August 28, 2018: 
 
 Male Female Total 
White 204 59.64% 1 33.3% 59.42% 
Black 129 37.72% 2 66.7% 37.97% 
Other 9 2.63% 0 0% 2.61% 
Total 342 99.13% 3 0.87%  
Table 7: Gender Composition of Florida’s Death Row140 
 
 
 134 For more on the death warrant process, see Kalmanson, Somewhere Be-
tween Death Row and Death Watch, supra note 10, at 6–13. 
 135 Death Row, supra note 5. 
 136 ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 36. 
 137 Death Row, supra note 5. 
 138 Id. As of July 1, 2016, the population of Raiford was 237. Raiford, Florida 
Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview 
.com/us-cities/raiford-fl-population/ last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 139 Death Row, supra note 5. 
 140 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 2017–18 ANNUAL REPORT, at 26 (2018), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1718/FDC_AR2017-18.pdf [hereinafter 
ANNUAL REPORT 2017–2018]; Corrections Offender Network: Death Row Ros-
ter, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRS., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/deathrow 
roster.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180828015944/http://www.dc.state.fl.us:80/OffenderSearch/deathrow-
roster.aspx] [hereinafter Death Row Roster]. 
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It is interesting to compare these numbers to the DOC’s popula-
tion.141 Of the DOC’s first-degree murder population, 4.4% were 
women and 95.6% were men.142 However, only 0.87% of Florida’s 
death row is female, while 99.13% of Florida’s death row is male.143 
This data overwhelmingly suggests that men are sentenced to death 
disproportionately more than women. 
In fact, this seems to be a constant trend in Florida and across 
the nation.144 DOC reports the following gender breakdown for 
death row over between 2012 and 2016, all of which suggest the 
same disproportionate gender distribution: 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Males 398 400 391 390 384 
Females 4 5 5 5 4 
Table 8: Death Row Gender Composition (2012–2016) 145 
 
Similarly, “[s]tudies of gender disparity . . . have usually found 
that women receive shorter sentences.”146 For example, Professor 
Starr reported gender disparities throughout the federal criminal sys-
tem, showing that women are favored throughout the sentencing 
process.147 
Section B below addresses the race of defendants sentenced to 
death. 
B. Race of Defendants 
Between 2011 and 2015, Whites accounted for an average of 
237 inmates or 59.4% of Florida’s death row, and Blacks accounted 
for an average of 148 inmates or 37% of Florida’s death row.148 
 
 141 See supra Table 2. 
 142 See Inmate Population, supra note 75. 
 143 See ANNUAL REPORT 2017–2018, supra note 140, at 26. 
 144 See Current Female Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/women (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) 
(showing that there are only 53 women on death row in the United States as of 
January 1, 2020). 
 145 ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70, at 37. 
 146 Starr, supra note 85, at 3. 
 147 See id. at 11. 
 148 See ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 37. 
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Other races accounted for the remaining 15 inmates or 3.8% of Flor-
ida’s death row.149 Figure 1 below indicates the racial composition 
of Florida’s death row, in number of defendants, between 2011 and 
2015. 
 
Figure 1: Racial Composition of Florida’s Death Row 
 
Comparing this information to the racial composition of defend-
ants imprisoned for first-degree murder from Table 3, supra, the fol-
lowing becomes clear: the racial composition of Florida’s death row 
varies from the racial composition of the DOC’s general population. 
As of June 30, 2016, the DOC’s general population (99,119 inmates) 
was 47.6% white, 48.1% black, and 4.5% other.150 Therefore, con-
trary to what some would expect, Whites are overrepresented on 
death row compared to the DOC’s general population while Blacks 
are underrepresented. 
More importantly, the racial composition of Florida’s death row 
is different than the racial composition of the DOC population of 
first-degree murder defendants.151 As stated above, between 2011 
and 2015, Florida’s death row averaged 59.4% white, 37% black, 
and 3.8% other; whereas,152 whereas, the population of first-degree 
murder defendants was 42.8% white, 52.4% black, and 4.8% 
 
 149 See id. 
 150 ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 70, at 28. 
 151 Compare supra Table 6, with supra Figure 1. 
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other.153 Therefore, Whites are overrepresented by almost 17% on 
death row compared to the DOC population of first-degree murder 
defendants. This suggests—contrary to skepticism of racial discrim-
ination in the capital sentencing process—that Whites are sentenced 
to death disproportionately more than Blacks. Of course, this num-
ber may be skewed if Blacks are prosecuted for crimes—specifically 
first-degree murder—disproportionately more than Whites because 
the number of Blacks convicted of first-degree murder would, there-
fore, be too high to accurately compare in this context. 
Having reviewed several racial disparities in Florida’s criminal 
justice system, it becomes clear that Blacks are generally over-pros-
ecuted and convicted. However, the racial disparities decrease as 
one focuses on first-degree murder convictions and capital sentenc-
ing. Perhaps this is because, as some argue, a lot of racial disparity 
and biased prosecution occurs outside the capital sentencing arena—
for example, in the prosecution of drug charges.154 Part IV below 
reviews the demographics of defendants executed in Florida before 
the paradigm shift caused by the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in 
Hurst v. Florida. 
IV. EXECUTIONS IN FLORIDA BEFORE HURST V. FLORIDA IN 
JANUARY 2016 
“Florida was given the authority to execute inmates by the 1923 
Legislature.”155 In the 1990s, Florida switched to “using lethal in-
jection as its execution method,”156 which remains the primary 
method of execution today.157 The first execution in Florida after 
1923 was of Frank Johnson on October 7, 1924.158 From 1923 until 
 
 153 See Inmate Population, supra note 75. 
 154 See ALEXANDER, supra note 96, at 112–14. 
 155 ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 36. 
 156 Florida, supra note 130; see also ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 
68, at 36. 
 157 FLA. STAT. § 922.105(1) (2020); see also Methods of Execution, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execu-
tion (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). For more on the history of execution methods, 
see STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 29, at 13–17. 
 158 ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 36. 
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Florida’s last execution before the Supreme Court’s decision in Fur-
man, Florida executed 196 defendants.159 Executions in Florida re-
sumed after Furman on May 25, 1979, with the execution of John 
Spenkelink.160 Between Furman and Hurst, Florida executed 
ninety-two defendants.161 The year with the highest number of exe-
cutions in Florida was 2014 with eight executions.162 Also between 
Furman and Hurst, twenty-seven Florida death row defendants were 
exonerated.163 
Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr., who was convicted of crimes committed in 
1986164—was executed an eerie five days before the Supreme Court 
released its opinion in Hurst v. Florida, invalidating Florida’s capi-
tal sentencing scheme under which Bolin was sentenced.165 Since 
Hurst, Florida has executed seven inmates, the most recent of whom 
was Gary Bowles on August 22, 2019.166 Also since Hurst, two 
death row defendants in Florida were exonerated.167 
 
 159 See Execution List: 1924–1964, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/execlist2.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2019) [hereinaf-
ter Execution List: 1924–1964]. 
 160 Execution List: 1976–Present, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/execlist.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) [hereinafter 
Execution List: 1976–Present]. 
 161 See id.; Death Row, supra note 5. 
 162 Death Row, supra note 5. For information on the number of executions 
each year, see Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 163 See Florida, supra note 130. Florida has exonerated a total of twenty-nine 
death row defendants; however, two exonerations were after Hurst v. Florida was 
decided in 2016. See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 164 Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160; Sara DiNatale & Dan Sul-
livan, Oscar Ray Bolin Jr. Executed After Four-Hour Delay for Final Appeal, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.tampabay.com/news/ 
publicsafety/execution-of-oscar-ray-bolin-under-delay-for-final-appeal-to-us-su-
preme/2260491/. 
 165 136 S. Ct. 616 (decided on January 12, 2016). 
 166 Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160; see also Kalmanson, Storm 
of the Decade, supra note 7, at 54. 
 167 Florida, supra note 130; see also Clemente Aguirre Exonerated From 
Florida’s Death Row After DNA Implicates Prosecution Witness, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/7238 (dis-
cussing the exoneration of Clemente Aguirre); Florida Man Exonerated 42 Years 
After Wrongful Conviction and Death Sentence, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
(Mar. 29, 2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/florida-man-exonerated-42-
years-after-wrongful-conviction-and-death-sentence (discussing the exoneration 
of Clifford Williams, Jr.). 
1020 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:990 
This Part reviews the demographics of defendants executed in 
Florida since executions resumed after Furman, finding that Flor-
ida’s system of execution does not indicate bias in the selection for 
execution. 
A. Age of Executed Defendants 
The age at which a capital defendant commits a crime and is 
executed has long been a topic of constitutional discussion.168 In 
1994, the Florida Supreme Court held that “the death penalty is ei-
ther cruel or unusual punishment if imposed upon one who was un-
der the age of sixteen when committing the crime; and death thus is 
prohibited by article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”169 At 
that time, “more than half a century ha[d] elapsed since Florida last 
executed one who was less than sixteen years of age at the time of 
committing an offense. In the intervening years, only two death pen-
alties [were] imposed on such persons, and both of these later were 
overturned.”170 
It was not until 2005 that the Supreme Court determined in 
Roper v. Simmons that executing defendants who were under the age 
of eighteen when they committed the offense for which they re-
ceived a sentence of death violates the Eighth Amendment.171 The 
Roper Court explained that differences between juveniles under the 
age of 18 and adults made it impossible to classify juveniles “among 
the worst offenders.”172 Specifically, the Court explained that juve-
niles lack the requisite maturity to render “their irresponsible con-
duct . . . as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”173 
 
 168 For an explanation of cases on this topic, see generally Ellen Marrus & 
Irene Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids Out of Adult 
Criminal Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1151 (2005). 
 169 Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 172 Id. at 569–70 (describing “[t]hree general differences between juveniles 
under 18 and adults [which] demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reli-
ability be classified among the worst offenders.”). 
 173 Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plu-
rality opinion)). 
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Prior to Roper, Florida did not execute any defendants under the 
age of eighteen between 1979 and 2004.174 Nor were any of the de-
fendants executed in Florida during that time eighteen or younger 
when they committed the offense.175 Of the ninety-two executions 
in Florida between Furman and Hurst,176 Richard Henyard—who 
was executed in September 2008, after Roper—was the youngest 
defendant to be executed; he was eighteen years old at the time of 
his offense.177 The average age at the time of the offense, since the 
execution of John Spenkelink in 1979, is 29.8 years old, and the av-
erage age at the time of execution is 46.6 years old.178 
Figure 2 below illustrates the age at the time of the offense and 
at the time of execution of the ninety-two defendants executed in 
Florida between Furman and Hurst.179 
 
 174 See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 175 See id. However, before 1979, Florida executed at least four defendants 
who were younger than eighteen years old at the time of execution. See Execution 
List: 1924–1964, supra note 159.  Fortune Ferguson, executed April 27, 1927, 
Edward Powell, executed December 29, 1941, Willie Clay, executed December 
29, 1941, and James Davis, executed October 9, 1944, were the youngest to be 
executed in the State of Florida. See id. All four were black males who were 16 
years old at the time of execution. See id. 
 176 See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160; Death Row, supra note 
5. 
 177 Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160; see also Henyard v. State, 
689 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). Although Execution List: 1976–
Present, supra note 160, indicates that Darious Kimbrough was 18 years old at 
the time of the offense, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on direct appeal 
indicated that he was actually 19 years old at the time of the offense. Kimbrough 
v. State, 700 So. 2d 634, 637 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam). 
 178 Death Row Facts, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/secre-
tary/press/2014/Death-Row-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last revised Oct. 2015) 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171215173829/http://www.dc.state.fl.us/secre-
tary/press/2014/Death-Row-Fact-Sheet.pdf]; see also Execution List: 1976–Pre-
sent, supra note 160. 
 179 See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
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Figure 2: Age of Defendants at Offense and Execution 
 
A close review of Figure 2 indicates the following: (1) consistent 
with the discussion above, defendants convicted of first-degree mur-
der are generally younger than forty years old when they commit the 
offense, (2) the time between a defendant committing the offense 
and sentencing is fairly consistent, and (3) the time of execution is 
unpredictable. 
First, as to the defendants’ age at the time of the offense, fifty-
two, or 56.5%, of the ninety-two defendants executed in the State of 
Florida between Furman and Hurst were between the ages of twenty 
and twenty-nine years old at the time of the offense.180 Twenty-
seven, or 29.3%, of the defendants, were between the ages of thirty 
and thirty-nine years old at the time of the offense.181 The remaining 
nine, or 9.8%, of the defendants, were older than forty years of age 
at the time of the offense.182 Table 9 below summarizes this infor-




 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
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18-20 3.3% 0% 0% 
20-29 56.5% 46.7% 1.1% 
30-39 29.3% 42.4% 25% 
40-49 6.5% 8.7% 40.2% 
50-60+ 3.3% 2.2% 33.7% 
Table 9: Age of Defendants Executed in Florida 
 
Second, Figure 2 indicates that the time between a defendant 
committing the offense and sentencing is fairly consistent among 
defendants because the “Age at Offense” line follows the “Age at 
Sentencing” line very closely, with a slight gap between ages of 
thirty and thirty-nine. This consistency is likely attributable to Flor-
ida’s speedy trial rules, which place stringent timelines on the State 
for bringing defendants to trial.183 
Finally, unlike the time between the offense and sentencing, the 
time between the offense and/or sentencing and execution is not 
consistent among defendants.184 If the time between the offense 
and/or sentencing and execution was consistent, we would expect 
the “Age at Execution” line to closely follow the “Age at Offense” 
and/or “Age at Sentencing” line. Therefore, Figure 2 confirms what 
is often discussed as a flaw in the capital sentencing system and ar-
gued in court as a violation of defendants’ constitutional rights: the 
unpredictability of the time of execution.185 Defendants often wait 
 
 183 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. 
CONST. art. I, § 16(a). 
 184 See Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-row (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 185 See, e.g., Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch, 
supra note 10, at 8–9. Defendants have argued for years that the time spent on 
death row awaiting execution amounts to a violation of their Eighth Amendment 
right against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 217 So. 
3d 977, 988 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam) (“In his final postconviction claim, Lambrix 
alleges that the totality of the punishment the State has imposed on him, which 
now includes not just execution, but also more than three decades of being on 
death row, violates the Eighth Amendment.”). 
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years, even decades, between sentencing and execution.186 While 
some states have attempted to remedy this inconsistency, the prob-
lem remains because the executive branch has essentially unfettered 
discretion in choosing defendants for execution and scheduling ex-
ecutions.187 
Part B below reviews the gender of defendants executed in Flor-
ida since 1979. 
B. Gender of Executed Defendants 
Only two of the ninety-two inmates executed in Florida since 
Furman were females: Judias Buenoano in March 1998, and Aileen 
Wuornos in October 2002.188 Both Buenoano and Wuornos were 
White females,189 meaning that Florida did not execute any Black 
female between 1979 and the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in 
Hurst v. Florida. Wuornos was ultimately convicted of six murders 
and confessed to a seventh, garnering her the title of “America’s first 
female serial killer.”190 Therefore, since 1976, only 2.2% of the 
ninety-two inmates executed in Florida were female and 97.8% were 
male.191 
Compared to the 2016 DOC population of defendants convicted 
for the primary offense of first-degree murder (95.6% male and 
4.4% female), it appears that men are executed more often than 
women.192 However, that would inaccurately include capital defend-
ants not sentenced to death. Comparing the gender composition of 
Florida’s death row (99.13% male and 0.87% female) to the gender 
distribution of these ninety-two executions, it would seem that fe-
males are executed relatively more than males.193 This information 
 
 186 See Time on Death Row, supra note 184; see also Execution List; 1976–
Present, supra note 160. 
 187 See Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch, supra 
note 10, 23–30. Defendants also argue that the unfettered discretion in choosing 
defendants and scheduling executions amounts to a violation of due process and 
separation of powers. See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 509 (Fla. 2017) 
(per curiam). 
 188 ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 36; Execution List: 1976–
Present, supra note 160. 
 189 Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 190 Florida, supra note 130. 
 191 See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 192 See supra Table 2. 
 193 See supra Table 7. 
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is similar to the gender distribution of executions across the United 
States. Of the 1,422 defendants executed in the United States be-
tween Furman and Hurst, only 16, or 1.13%, were female, meaning 
98.87% of executed defendants were male.194 
Part C analyzes the race of executed defendants. 
C. Race of Executed Defendants 
Of the ninety-two inmates executed in Florida since Furman, 
fifty-nine, or 64.1%, were White, twenty-nine, or 31.5%, were 
Black, one, or 1%, was Hispanic, and three, or 3.3%, were another 
race.195 Obviously, factors such as pending and outstanding appeals 
affect whose sentence may matriculate to an execution.196 However, 
on average, as compared to Florida’s inmate population, there is in-
dication that Florida executes Whites more than Blacks. 
Similarly, and more specifically, between 2011 and 2015, 
Whites represented 59.4% of Florida’s death row.197 In the same 
time, Florida conducted 23 executions, 16, or 69.6%, of which were 
White, and 7, or 30.4%, of which were Black.198 
Table 10 below indicates the racial breakdown for the 1,422 de-
fendants who were executed across the United States from 1976 to 
2015.199 
 







Table 10: Race of Defendants Executed in United States 
 
 
 194 See Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/executions/execution-database (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 195 See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 196 See Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch, supra 
note 10, at 6–13. 
 197 See supra Table 7. 
 198 See Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160. 
 199 See Execution Database, supra note 194. 
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Compared to executions across the United States, Whites are ex-
ecuted in Florida 8.7% more, while Blacks are executed 3.24% 
less.200 Finally, Hispanics are executed 7.23% less in Florida than in 
the United States generally.201 Thus, contrary to popular arguments, 
the demographics of those who Florida has executed does not sug-
gest racial bias. 
Theoretically, that the statistics suggest an absence of discrimi-
nation in Florida’s capital sentencing system is favorable because it 
suggests the absence of discrimination in capital sentencing and ex-
ecutions. However, this could be more hopeful than reality. The sta-
tistics suggesting a lack of discrimination could also be a result of 
other factors that inhere discrimination or bias, such as unilateral 
prosecutorial discretion in determining whether to seek death as a 
punishment and executive discretion in choosing defendants for and 
scheduling executions.202  
Having reviewed Florida’s death row as it was when the Su-
preme Court decided Hurst v. Florida, Part V seeks to explain the 
practical implications of this recent paradigm shift and how it af-
fected those who were awaiting execution on Florida’s death row 
when the Supreme Court issued its decision. 
V. REVIEWING FLORIDA’S DEATH ROW IN LIGHT OF HURST V. 
FLORIDA AND ITS PROGENY 
As explained above, the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst 
v. Florida203 invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing scheme under 
the Sixth Amendment. But Hurst v. Florida left several unanswered 
questions—harmless error, the proper remedy, retroactivity, 
etc.204—that the Florida Supreme Court first answered on remand in 
 
 200 Compare Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160, with supra Table 
10. 
 201 Compare Execution List: 1976–Present, supra note 160, with supra Table 
10. 
 202 See, e.g., Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch, 
supra note 10, at 10. Of course, this unilateral discretion begs the question of 
whether we have effectively removed arbitrariness from capital sentencing.  
 203 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 204 See id. at 624 (refusing to reach the State’s assertion of harmless error). 
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Hurst v. State205 and other, related decisions.206 However, as ex-
plained above, the answers to those post-Hurst v. Florida questions 
are not set in stone and, instead, seem to remain in flux—as indi-
cated by recent decisions form the Supreme Court of Florida.207 
This Part reviews Florida’s death row in the context of the juris-
prudence developed in Hurst and its progeny, using data from Flor-
ida’s death row population when Hurst v. Florida was decided.208 
A. Date Sentence Became Final 
In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he anal-
ysis the Ring Court applied to Arizona’s sentencing scheme applies 
equally to Florida’s” capital sentencing scheme.209 Because Ring 
was the precursor to the rights announced in Hurst v. Florida,210 the 
Florida Supreme Court determined in Asay V that the rights an-
nounced in Hurst v. Florida did not apply retroactively to sentences 
of death that were final before June 28, 2002, the date the Supreme 
Court decided Ring.211 In Mosley v. State, the Florida Supreme 
Court clarified that Hurst v. Florida applies retroactively to sen-
tences of death that were final after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ring.212 
Although this framework may not be the Court’s final say as to 
Hurst v. Florida retroactivity,213 it is the framework the Court ap-
plied in reviewing hundreds of appeals in which defendants sought 
 
 205 See Hurst v. State, 203 So. 3d 40, 66–69 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (perform-
ing harmless error analysis). 
 206 See, e.g., Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 15–22 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (re-
fusing to apply Hurst v. Florida retroactively to defendant’s death sentence based 
on a lengthy retroactivity analysis). 
 207 See, e.g., State v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302, at *9, *15 (Fla. 
Jan. 23, 2020) (per curiam); see also Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade, supra note 
7, at 60–61. 
 208 See supra note 5. 
 209 136 S. Ct. at 621–22 (2016); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 
(2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury finding of enumerated 
aggravating factors under Arizona law). 
 210 See 136 S. Ct. at 621–22. 
 211 Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 11, 15–22 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam). 
 212 Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248,1283 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam). 
 213 See Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade, supra note 7, at 64–65 (explaining 
how the Supreme Court has indicated it may recede from Asay and Mosley in 
Owen v. State). 
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relief after Hurst v. Florida.214 Therefore, this Part reviews the time 
at which the sentences of death imposed before Hurst v. Florida be-
came final. In other words, this Part reviews the breakdown of sen-
tences to which Hurst v. Florida applied retroactively under Asay 
and Mosley. Likewise, this Part explains how a change in the 
Asay/Mosley framework would affect capital defendants in Flor-
ida.215 
Of the approximately 390 defendants awaiting execution under 
sentences of death when Hurst v. Florida was decided,216 44.6% be-
came final before Ring.217 Another 44.6% became final after 
Ring.218 The other 42 or 10.8% were not yet final when Hurst v. 
Florida was decided; they were pending on direct appeal.219 This 
information is demonstrated in Table 11 below. 
 
When Death Sentence 
Became Final 
Before Ring 44.6% 




Table 11: Date Sentences Became Final 
 
Several Florida cases make clear that the Supreme Court’s line-
drawing with Ring in its retroactivity framework created constitu-
tional significance for capital defendants in the difference of one 
day.220 For example, Bradley’s sentence became final on November 
 
 214 See id. at 49. 
 215 See id. at 64–65. 
 216 See ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 37. 
 217 See Death Row Roster, supra note 140. 
 218 See id. 
 219 See id. 
 220 See Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 745–47 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam); 
Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1184 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam); Looney v. State, 
803 So. 2d 656, 682–83 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam). 
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26, 2001,221 less than two months before the Supreme Court ac-
cepted certiorari in Ring on January 11, 2002.222 Bowles’s sentence 
became final on June 17, 2002223—eleven days before the U.S. Su-
preme Court issued its decision in Ring.224 And, Looney’s sentence 
became final on June 28, 2002225—one month after the Ring deci-
sion was released.226 Of the three, only Looney would be entitled to 
the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida under Mosley and 
Asay V. 
 
Defendant Date of Offense Date Sentence 
Final 
Bradley November 7, 1995227 November 26, 2001 
Bowles November 16, 1994228 June 17, 2002 
Looney July 27, 1997229 June 28, 2002 
Table 12: Demonstration of Ring Distinction for Retroactivity 
of Hurst 
 
In essence, Asay V drew a line down the middle of Florida’s 
death row: defendants standing on one side were precluded from 
claiming a right to Hurst relief and the defendants whose sentences 
were imposed recently enough that they could raise a claim to Hurst 
relief stand on the other.230  
B. Jury Vote to Recommend Death 
Before Hurst v. Florida, Florida’s capital sentencing scheme re-
quired that only a majority of the twelve-member jury recommend 
 
 221 See Bradley v. Florida, 534 U.S. 1048 (2001) (cert. denied on Nov. 26, 
2001). 
 222 State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc), cert. granted, Ring v. 
Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103, 1103 (2002). 
 223 See Bowles v. Florida, 536 U.S. 930 (2002) (cert. denied on Jun. 17, 2002). 
 224 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 584 (decided June 24, 2002). 
 225 See Looney v. Florida, 536 U.S. 966, 966 (2002) (cert. denied on June 28, 
2002). 
 226 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 584 (decided June 24, 2002). 
 227 Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam). 
 228 Amended Answer Brief of Appellee at *8, *15–16, Bowles v. Florida, 804 
So.2d 1173 (Fla. 2001) (No. 96,732). 
 229 Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 662 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam). 
 230 See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22, 29 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam). 
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a sentence of death before the trial judge, who, upon individual con-
siderations and findings, could sentence a defendant to death.231 
Only seven jurors had to recommend death before the trial judge 
could sentence the defendant to death.232 In fact, in some cases, the 
trial court sentenced the defendant to death with even less.233 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, be-
fore the Florida Supreme Court decided Hurst v. State on remand, 
the Florida Legislature revised Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
to require a 10 to 2 jury vote in favor of recommending death before 
the trial judge could impose a sentence of death.234 However, in 
Hurst v. State, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the Sixth 
Amendment and article I, section 22, of the Florida Constitution and 
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution require that “the 
penalty phase jury must be unanimous in making the . . . recommen-
dation . . . necessary before a sentence of death may be considered 
by the judge or imposed.”235 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court inval-
idated that interim statute.236 
Further, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Hurst errors 
are “capable of harmless error review,” and, in this context, “the 
burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s failure to unanimously find 
 
 231 FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 921.141 (2015). 
 232 See § 921.141(3). 
 233  See, e.g., 18 Years After Enacting DNA Law, Florida Death-Row Prisoners 
Are Still Being Denied Testing, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/18-years-after-enacting-dna-law-florida-
death-row-prisoners-are-still-being-denied-testing. Although a Florida jury rec-
ommended that Tommy Ziegler receive a life sentence for his quadruple-murder 
conviction, the trial judge overrode that recommendation to sentence Ziegler to 
death. Id.  
 234 H.B. 7101, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016), invalidated by Perry v. State, 
210 So. 3d 630, 632–34, 640–41 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam), overruled by No. SC18-
150, 2019 WL 419702, at *872 (Fla. Sept. 5, 2019) (per curiam). But cf. Evans v. 
State, 213 So. 3d 856, 859 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam) (holding that the provisions 
of H.B. 7101 “identified as problematic in Perry . . . can only be constitutionally 
applied under our decisions in Hurst and Perry to pending prosecutions for a jury 
recommendation of death if twelve jurors unanimously determine that a defendant 
should be sentenced to death.”). 
 235 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44, 59 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) receded from 
by State v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020) (per cu-
riam). 
 236 Perry, 210 So. 3d at 632–34, 640–41; see also Evans, 213 So. 3d at 859. 
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all the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty did not 
contribute to [the defendant’s] death sentence.”237 Later, in Davis v. 
State, the Florida Supreme Court explained that “[a]s applied to the 
right to a jury trial with regard to the facts necessary to impose the 
death penalty, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a ra-
tional jury would have unanimously found that there were sufficient 
aggravating factors that outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances.”238 
The jury’s recommendation for death in Hurst’s trial was 7 to 
5.239 Applying this new post-Hurst harmless error standard, the 
Court determined that “the error in Hurst’s sentencing [was] not 
shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”240 
[W]e cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that no 
rational jury, as the trier of fact, would determine that 
the mitigation was “sufficiently substantial” to call 
for a life sentence. Nor can we say beyond a reason-
able doubt there is no possibility that the Hurst v. 
Florida error in this case contributed to the sentence. 
We decline to speculate as to why seven jurors in this 
case recommended death and why five jurors were 
persuaded that death was not the appropriate penalty. 
To do so would be contrary to our clear precedent 
governing harmless error review.241 
However, in Davis, the Florida Supreme Court determined that 
a jury’s pre-Hurst v. Florida unanimous recommendation for death 
allowed the Court “to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have unanimously found that there were suffi-
cient aggravators to outweigh the mitigating factors.”242 Regarding 
Davis’s case, the Florida Supreme Court explained that the pre-
Hurst v. Florida jury’s unanimous recommendation for death al-
lowed the Court to “conclude that the State [could] sustain its burden 
 
 237 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 68. 
 238 Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 174 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam). 
 239 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 47, 52, 68. 
 240 Id. at 69. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Davis, 207 So. 3d at 174. 
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of demonstrating that any [Hurst] error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”243 Thus, Davis was not entitled to Hurst relief.244 
Accordingly, the differentiating factor between a harmful error and 
harmless Hurst error appears to be a unanimous and non-unanimous 
jury recommendation for death. 
Of the approximately 390 defendants who were awaiting execu-
tion on Florida’s death row when the Supreme Court decided Hurst 
v. Florida,245 6.2% of the jury votes to recommend death are un-
known, and 5.4% waived their right to a penalty phase jury.246 Of 
the remaining defendants, two (Marshall247 and Ziegler248) were 
sentenced to death after the trial judge overrode the jury’s recom-
mendation for a sentence of life; 19.9% were sentenced to death af-
ter a unanimous jury recommended a sentence of death; and 79.5% 
were sentenced to death after a non-unanimous jury recommended 
a sentence of death.249 
Table 13 and Figure 3 below show the distribution of jury votes 
to recommend a sentence of death across Florida’s death row at the 
time Hurst v. Florida was decided.250 Note that this information in-
cludes all pending death sentences in Florida when Hurst v. Florida 





 243 Id. at 175. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See ANNUAL REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 68, at 37. 
 246 See Florida Death-Penalty Appeals Decided in Light of Hurst, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/florida-death-penalty-
appeals-decided-in-light-of-hurst (last updated Jan. 23, 2020). 
 247 Id. 
 248 See 18 Years After Enacting DNA Law, Florida Death-Row Prisoners Are 
Still Being Denied Testing, supra note 233.  
 249 See Florida Death-Penalty Appeals Decided in Light of Hurst, supra note 
246; see also Florida Prisoners Sentenced to Death After Non-Unanimous Jury 
Recommendations, Whose Convictions Became Final After Ring, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6790 (last visited Mar. 
30, 2020). 
 250 See Florida Death-Penalty Appeals Decided in Light of Hurst, supra note 
246. 
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Table 13: Distribution of Jury Votes on Florida’s Death Row 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Jury Votes on Florida’s Death Row 
 
Based on this information, we can estimate—assuming that the 
jury votes were evenly distributed between pre- and post-Ring sen-
tences—that, under the Davis framework, the Hurst error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt in approximately 17.5% of the cases 
to which Hurst applied. However, this number is probably higher, 
considering that there were likely 12-0 recommendations in at least 
some of the twenty-four unknown jury votes. 
Likewise, we can estimate that if Hurst v. Florida applied to all 










Jury Votes Represented on Florida's Death 
Row
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fully retroactive—88.4% of defendants on death row would have 
been entitled to Hurst relief. This is calculated by subtracting the 
5.4% of defendants who waived their right to a penalty phase jury 
and the 6.2% of unknown jury votes, from the total 100%. The 0.5% 
of jury recommendations for life are included in the defendants who 
would have been entitled to Hurst relief under full retroactivity be-
cause those defendants were denied Hurst relief based on the 
Court’s retroactivity decision in Asay V, not because Hurst relief 
was inappropriate for juridical overrides.251 Rather, the Court held 
that “judicial override[s] d[o] not warrant an exception to the retro-
activity [decision] in Asay [V].”252 
In light of State v. Poole, a jury’s unanimous recommendation 
for death is no longer required in Florida before a defendant may be 
sentenced to death.253 Thus, Poole could affect approximately 190 
defendants on death row: approximately 88.4% of defendants would 
have been entitled to relief under Hurst and adjusting for retroactiv-
ity. 
Retroactivity:254 390 x (44.6% + 10.8 %) = 216  
Entitled to relief before Poole: 216 x 88.4% = 190 
CONCLUSION 
It may seem easy to discuss capital punishment in numeric 
terms—the difference of one vote in determining whether a Hurst 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or the difference of one 
day in determining whether a defendant is entitled to retroactive ap-
plication of Hurst v. Florida. However, each number is a defendant 
waiting for a decision between life or death, or another chance at the 
difference between life or death. Since reenacting capital punish-
ment following Furman, Florida has remained one of the nationwide 
leaders in capital sentencing and executions. Florida is home to one 
of the country’s largest death row populations—housing approxi-
mately 390 defendants awaiting execution when the Supreme Court 
 
 251 See Marshall v. Jones, 226 So. 3d 211, 211 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam); see 
also Zakrzewski v. Jones, 221 So. 3d 1159, 1159 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam). 
 252 Zakrzewski, 221 So. 3d at 1159; see also Marshall, 226 So. 3d at 211. 
 253 See State v. Poole, No. SC18-245, 2020 WL 370302, at *12–13 (Fla. Jan. 
23, 2020) (per curiam). 
 254 See supra Table 11. 
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determined in January 2016 that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
violated the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, 
understanding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is important in 
understanding the American death penalty generally. 
By reviewing the demographics of Florida’s death penalty, this 
Article has shown that, while some aspects of capital sentencing in 
Florida are consistent—such as the time between the defendant’s 
crime and sentencing—other aspects are not, such as the time be-
tween sentencing and execution. Further, the racial, age, and ethnic 
makeup of Florida’s death row and, more specifically, those who are 
executed in Florida is almost completely unpredictable. 
Moreover, this Article reviewed the practical effect of Hurst v. 
Florida and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on remand in 
Hurst v. State and other related decisions. Specifically, this Article 
showed that the Court’s determination that Hurst applies only to 
sentences of death that became final before June 24, 2002, essen-
tially splitting Florida’s death row in half as to who may receive 
Hurst relief and who was precluded from even claiming such relief. 
Finally, this Article showed that the Court’s institution of an 
unanimity requirement in the jury’s final recommendation for 
death—bringing Florida in line with the rest of the country (except 
Alabama)—likely would have significantly decreased the number 
of death sentences imposed in Florida. However, the Court’s 2020 
decision in State v. Poole realigned Florida with Alabama as the 
only two states in the country that do not require unanimity in the 
jury’s final recommendation for death. In other words, Poole made 
it much easier for prosecutors to obtain a sentence of death and, like-
wise, trial courts to sentence defendants to death. In short: Hurst v. 
Florida caused several important changes but also may have perpet-
uated the arbitrariness that the Supreme Court sought to distinguish 
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